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Islam and Religious Transformation in Adjara 
The Autonomous Republic of Adjara, located in the southwest corner of Georgia along the Turkish 
border, has been the scene of a peculiar religious transformation in the last two decades. Specifically, 
large segments of Adjara’s traditionally Muslim population have undergone a relatively quick rate of 
conversion to Christianity. Whereas the region’s population was predominantly Muslim at the time of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, or at least nominally so after seven decades of official Soviet atheism, more 
recent figures indicate that Adjara’s confessional makeup is approximately 65% Christian and 30% 
Muslim. Unlike Georgia’s other Muslim groups in the Kvemo Kartli region and Pankisi, where Muslims are 
ethnic Azeris and Kists, respectively, Adjara’s Muslims are ethnically Georgian. 
 
Thomas Liles, February 2012 
ECMI Working Paper #57 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While Adjara’s Islamic identity has been in decline, 
the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has increased 
its presence in Adjara’s capital Batumi and western 
lowlands since the 1990s. Today Islam retains a strong 
presence primarily in the republic’s eastern highlands 
(upper Adjara), specifically in the Khulo district and to 
a lesser extent in the more rural areas of the Shuakhevi 
and Keda districts. With financial support from the 
state, the GOC maintains a growing presence in upper 
Adjara, and conversions to Christianity in the area are 
becoming more common. Simultaneously, certain 
segments of the region’s Muslim population express 
dissatisfaction with perceived state discrimination, 
mainly resulting from the lack of state funding for 
local Islamic institutions and the difficulties of legally 
registering such institutions. With the creation of the 
new Administration of Georgian Muslims (AGM) in 
May 2011 and the passage of a new law on the 
registration of minority religious groups in July 2011, 
this discontent may well subside. However, it is still 
too early to tell whether these laws will have a 
significant effect in upper Adjara. 
The purpose of this working paper is to 
provide an assessment of the current religious situation 
in upper Adjara. The paper will be organized around 
three themes. Firstly, the current situation will be 
contextualized through an analysis of the structural 
factors which have given impetus to religious 
transformation and conversion to Christianity. The 
intersection between Christianity, Georgian 




in this regard. On the one hand, the modern conception 
of Georgian national identity since the fall of the 
Soviet Union has come to be associated almost 
exclusively with Christianity. Simultaneously, young 
Adjarans’ access to education and economic 
opportunities often entails relocation to cities and 
regions where Christianity is the dominant religion. As 
discussed below, many people in Adjara – particularly 
younger people – are reconfiguring their religious 
identities in light of these structural developments, 
largely in order to be perceived as more legitimate 
members of the Georgian nation. 
Secondly, the paper will address the effects of 
local institutions on the religious situation in upper 
Adjara. These institutions fall into three categories: 1) 
the GOC and GOC-administered education 
institutions; 2) public secondary schools; and 3) local 
mosques, Islamic religious schools, or madrassahs, 
and independent Islamic organizations. Though the 
degree of active Christian proselytizing seems to be 
quite limited, the GOC continues to extend its presence 
in upper Adjara in the form of new churches, religious 
schools, and universities. Simultaneously, public 
secondary schools, though officially neutral in 
religious matters, demonstrate somewhat of a bias 
toward orthodoxy in the instruction of history.1 At the 
other end of the spectrum, the number of mosques, 
madrassahs, and Muslim organizations has increased 
                                                            
1 That is, the Christian history of Georgia is covered 
extensively, as is certainly necessary given the country’s 
historical association with orthodoxy. The main issue is that 
Adjara’s Islamic history receives essentially no attention. 
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in upper Adjara since the fall of the USSR, particularly 
in rural villages where Islam has a wider support base. 
Thus varying institutions, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, have some role in shaping local conceptions 
of religion. 
Finally, the working paper will analyze current 
Muslim issues as well as state policy on religious 
affairs in upper Adjara. While inter-religious relations 
in Adjara are quite good, many Muslim leaders and 
residents express frustration with perceived state 
discrimination. Namely, they argue that the state’s 
support for the GOC and the dominant orthodox-
centric nationalist discourse has created an 
exclusionary social environment in which Georgian 
Muslims are considered by many as illegitimate 
stakeholders in the Georgian nation. Furthermore, 
many Muslim leaders lament the state’s lack of 
concern for the effective operation of Muslim 
institutions, both in terms of lacking financial support 
and a 2010 incident involving the seizure of property 
from a Muslim charity in the Khulo district.2  
In its attempt to accelerate Georgia’s 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, 
however, the Georgian government has recently made 
a number of policy decisions regarding religious 
minority rights, decisions which are aimed at 
facilitating civic integration in the country.3 These 
policies will likewise be analyzed, along with their 
perceptions in Adjara and their tangible effects to date. 
The working paper will conclude by offering a brief 
set of recommendations to the Georgian government as 
to how religious affairs might be handled in upper 





                                                            
2 The incident occurred at several religious schools 
administered by the Muslim charity Madli-2005 in the 
Khulo district. The goal of the institution is to provide free 
room, board, and religious education to poor Muslim youth 
in Adjara. The reasons for government intervention were 
related to taxes and registration, though since 2010 the 
problem has more or less been resolved. 
3 The government’s work in this arena includes the May 
2011 creation of the Administration of Georgian Muslims 
(AGM), which – though not officially a state entity – was 
established with government support. Additionally, the 
government helped pass a new law on the registration of 
minority religious groups in July 2011, which allows non-
orthodox religious groups “with historic ties to Georgia” to 
register as legal entities of public law. The AGM is one of 
several minority religious groups already registered under 
the law. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Once Research for this working paper was conducted 
from September to December 2011. Numerous 
secondary sources – including academic publications 
as well as government and NGO reports – were 
consulted for those sections of the paper dealing 
primarily with history and background information. 
Likewise, extensive fieldwork was carried out in 
Adjara during the course of two research trips (7 
October – 4 November and 4 – 13 December 2011), 
primarily in the Khulo and Shuakhevi districts and the 
regional capital Batumi. 
Above all, qualitative methods (i.e. structured 
and non-structured interviews, focus groups) were 
employed during these fieldwork trips. Interviews 
were conducted with prominent Muslim religious 
leaders, including Adjara’s regional mufti and the 
muftis of the Shuakhevi and Khulo districts. 
Additionally, a focus group comprised of the Khulo 
district’s imams was conducted in the district muftiate 
in the administrative centre of Khulo. Research 
included trips to Islamic institutions throughout 
Adjara, including the Batumi mosque and mosques in 
the villages of Khulo-Centre, Duadzeebi, Didadjara, 
and Riketi, as well as two madrassahs in Khulo-
Centre. 
To find out how religion was taught in public 
schools, interviews and focus groups were conducted 
with teachers in secondary schools in Khulo-Centre, 
Didadjara, and Riketi. A number of orthodox 
institutions were also visited during the course of 
research, including the Khulo Church of Annunciation 
of the Virgin Mary, the GOC-administered secondary 
school in Khulo-Centre, and the GOC-administered 
Tbel Abuseridze State University in Khichauri 
(Shuakhevi district). At these institutions, interviews 
were conducted with priests, teachers, and professors. 
Several university students were also consulted during 
the trip to Tbel Abuseridze University.  
Finally, a number of government officials and 
religion experts in both Batumi and Tbilisi were 
interviewed. These interviewees had first hand 
knowledge of the religious situation in Adjara and 
were thus not only able to substantiate the findings of 
ECMI’s fieldwork in the region, but also contribute to 
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III. BACKGROUND 
As a border region under the suzerainty of various 
empires, both Adjara and Georgia as a whole have a 
long and complex history with different religious 
traditions. Under the dominance of the Roman empire 
during the third and fourth centuries, Christianity is 
said to have spread to Georgia through the missionary 
work of the apostles St. Andrew and Simon the Zealot 
as well as through the work of St. Nino beginning in 
328 AD. The religion’s adoption fortified the Georgian 
monarchy’s alliance with Rome, while also destroying 
the power of Georgia’s influential and wealthy pagan 
priesthood. Bishoprics were subsequently established 
in those towns which hosted a provincial government; 
by the middle of the fifth century, thirty bishoprics had 
been established.4 Nevertheless, Georgia remained 
politically decentralized for several more centuries. 
Regional noblemen often spoiled attempts at political 
centralization5, and the shifting hegemony of the 
Byzantine and Sassanid (Persian) empires in the region 
made Georgian unification a chimera.6 
Shifting imperial hegemony would continue in 
Georgia for several centuries, with Byzantium and 
Arab conquerors vying for control of much of the 
South Caucasus. The centralization of the Georgian 
state in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries signaled its 
development as a regional power, as well as a 
concomitant entrenchment of Christianity and the 
proliferation of Christian culture in Georgia.7 Yet, the 
fall of the Byzantine Empire – Georgia’s most 
prominent Christian ally at the time – to the invading 
Ottoman Turks in 1453 signaled an end to Georgia’s 
regional influence. The Ottomans soon embarked on 
military forays into southwestern Georgia, ultimately 
                                                            
4 Ronald G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington (1994), p. 21. 
5 Ibid. p. 20. 
6 The smaller medieval kingdoms located in what is now 
present-day Georgia dealt with foreign suzerainty in a 
number of ways, often with a religious component. The 
Kingdom of Lazica, which was comprised largely of what is 
now western Georgia, abandoned Christianity from the mid-
fifth century to the earlier sixth century after coming under 
the hegemony of Persia, at that time dominated by the 
Zoroastrian Sassanids. In 522, Lazian kings turned to 
Byzantium for aid, cementing the new alliance with renewed 
observance of Christianity. The Kingdom of Iberia in 
present-day southeastern Georgia remained Christian even 
under Sassanid rule, though Iberian kings likewise used 
Christianity to obtain support from Byzantium. David 
Braund, Georgia in Antiquity, Oxford University Press 
(1994), p. 282.  
7 Suny, op cit, Ref 5, p. 38. 
annexing the regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and 
Adjara in the seventeenth century.8 
Under Ottoman control, Adjara underwent a 
widespread religious transformation from orthodox 
Christianity to Islam. Though there is a lack of records 
from this period, it is generally thought that the 
conversion process occurred at different rates 
according to socioeconomic status. Most Adjaran 
noblemen are believed to have accepted Islam 
relatively soon after the Ottoman annexation, as 
conversion to the empire’s hegemonic religion 
guaranteed some degree of political and economic 
continuity through the preservation of existing local 
power structures. Additionally, there were tax 
incentives for converting, since the Ottoman millet 
system entailed a lower tax rate for Muslim segments 
of the empire’s population.9 On the other hand, large 
swathes of Adjara’s peasant population likely 
remained Christian for significantly longer, converting 
to Islam after several generations. There was no 
tangible incentive for peasants to convert, at least 
initially, and at any rate the Ottomans’ cultural and 
administrative presence in Adjara was comparatively 
weak for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.10 
Nevertheless, Islam had penetrated the 
majority of Adjara’s population by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century – approximately the same time 
that Ottoman rulers began to treat the region as a 
strategic asset. The Russian Empire’s expansion into 
the Caucasus in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries and the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 
1828-29 prompted Istanbul to increase its authority in 
Adjara. Adjara’s elite, bolstered by links to authorities 
in Istanbul, exhibited opposition to Russian expansion 
in the region and rejected Russian calls to switch 
allegiance. Relations between Muslim Adjarans and 
Christian Georgians in the surrounding regions also 
deteriorated, as the two sides carried out raids and 
military forays into each other’s territory. Secondary 
sources suggest that there was a concomitant rise in 
Islamic identity among Adjara’s elite at this time.11 
                                                            
8 Nugzar Mgeladze and Kevin Tuite, “Ajarians,” in 
Encyclopedia of World Cultures (1996), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3458000949.html.  
9 Ruslan Baramidze, The Georgian Muslims in the Context 
of Modernity, Niko Berdzenishvili Institute, Batumi (2010), 
p. 525. 
10 Interview with religion expert Levan Abashidze, 29 
November 2011. 
11 Mathijs Pelkmans, “Religion, Nation and State in 
Georgia: Christian Expansion in Muslim Ajara,” in Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002), p. 254.  
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Following Turkey’s defeat in the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-78, Adjara was ceded to the 
Russian Empire. The idea of potentially losing special 
privileges under Russian suzerainty – combined with 
Istanbul’s financially attractive resettlement offers for 
Adjarans – prompted much of Adjara’s elite to 
emigrate from the region to Turkey.12 Simultaneously, 
Russian authorities attempted to partially alter the 
demographic character of Adjara by stimulating 
Christian migration to the region. By and large, 
though, Russian rule did not entail strong attempts to 
change the fundamental nature of most Adjarans’ 
religious beliefs.13 Russian authorities officially 
demonstrated tolerance toward Muslims, and the 
Ottoman tax system remained in place.14 The most 
tangible transformation, perhaps, was that of the 
remaining Adjaran elites who retained their traditional 
Islamic beliefs, adapted to the new imperial Russian 
administration, and in many cases cultivated a sense of 
Georgian nationalism.15 
The rise of the Bolsheviks and the 
incorporation of Georgia into the Soviet Union in 1921 
proved considerably more consequential for Adjara’s 
religious situation. Certainly, Soviet ethno-territorial 
delimitations would have suggested a possible 
preservation of Muslim identity in Adjara, as the 
republic was granted Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (ASSR) status (within the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic) based entirely on its Sunni Islamic 
demographic makeup.16 In practice, however, a 
                                                            
12 Ibid. 255-56. 
13 George Sanikidze and Edward W. Walker, “Islam and 
Islamic Practices in Georgia,” BPS Working Paper Series, 
University of California, Berkeley (2004), p. 4. 
14 Tsarist authorities’ tolerance toward Islam did not have an 
entirely altruistic basis, but was rather a pragmatic policy 
aimed at gradually extending control over religious activities 
in the region. Simultaneously, possibilities for Islamic 
education abroad were curtailed, and imperial authorities 
issued a spate of regulations related to Muslim weddings, 
funerals, and religious holidays. Baramidze, op cit, Ref 10, 
p. 526. 
15 The relatives of former Adjaran strongman Aslan 
Abashidze represent a case in point. Abashidze hails from a 
prominent upper Adjaran Muslim clan which has yielded a 
number of prominent regional leaders. Abashidze’s 
grandfather, Mehmed Pacha Abashidze, was an observant 
Muslim and a prominent figure in Georgia’s national 
liberation movement following World War I. International 
Crisis Group, “Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable 
Elsewhere in Georgia?”, ICG Europe Briefing, 
Tbilisi/Brussels, 18 August 2004, p. 3. 
16 ASSR status was almost always reserved for regions with 
an ethnic makeup different from that of the titular 
nationality of the corresponding union republic. Adjara’s 
combination of imposed isolation, anti-Islamic 
tendencies among local cadres, and Soviet ethnic 
nationality policy put Islam in Adjara in a precarious 
situation. The closure of the Turkish border and the 
imposition of strict internal travel regulations, for 
example, led to significant isolation among upper 
Adjara’s Muslim population.17  
Concomitantly, Soviet atheist policy and the 
orientation of regional and local power structures had 
consequences for Islam. Though mosques and spiritual 
boards continued to function throughout the 1920s, the 
intense political centralization in the 1930s that came 
as a result of Stalin’s consolidation entailed the 
complete dismantling of Adjara’s Muslim spiritual 
boards and the closure of mosques and other religious 
institutions.18 Local authorities were of a decidedly 
more anti-Islamic orientation as well, in many cases 
transforming mosques into storage sheds.19 Moreover, 
Soviet nationality policy led to the construction and 
entrenchment of a Georgian national identity20  which, 
while not explicitly pro-orthodox, conveyed an 
implicit historical association with orthodoxy and thus 
created an environment in which the GOC would 
eventually surge.21 
 
                                                                                                       
autonomous status was an exception, borne out of the 1921 
Treaty of Kars between the Soviet Union and Turkey. 
Article VI of the treaty stipulated that Adjara be given 
autonomous status and that “each community is guaranteed 
its cultural and religious rights,” no doubt a reference to 
Islam. 
17 Interview with Levan Abashidze, 29 November 2011. 
Traveling within Adjara (Batumi excluded) was extremely 
difficult for Georgians and Adjarans alike. Reaching Khulo, 
for example,  entailed crossing two internal borders. 
18 Ruslan Baramidze, “Ethnic Georgian Muslims: A 
Comparison of Highland and Lowland Villages,” in 
Caucasus Analytical Digest, No. 20, ed. Thomas Bremer, 11 
October 2010, p. 13. 
19 The mosque in Khulo was used as a storage facility for 
chemicals and farm equipment, while the area immediately 
surrounding the mosque was used for the cultivation of 
crops. According to mufti Aslan Abashidze, a series of 
Muslim graves beside the mosque were ravaged and the 
corpses removed. 
20 For an in-depth explanation of Soviet nationalities policy, 
see Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, 
or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” in 
Becoming National, Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., 
Oxford University Press (1996), pp. 203-238.  
21 See Mathijs Pelkmans, Defending the Border: Identity, 
Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia, Cornell 
University Press (2006). 
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IV. THE ORTHODOXY-NATIONALISM 
NEXUS AND IDENTITY 
TRANSFORMATION IN ADJARA 
The religious transformation currently taking place in 
upper Adjara can, in large part, be traced to a number 
of structural developments that arose during the 
waning days of Soviet central power. Namely, the 
introduction of perestroika and glasnost and the 
subsequent onset of Georgia's independence movement 
engendered a potent brand of Georgian 
ethnonationalism in which orthodoxy played an 
explicit symbolic role. The GOC was also able to 
consolidate its position as an independent power base, 
advancing its mission with little state oversight and 
eventually serving as a de facto state consultative body 
and powerful lobby group. Thus the centrality of 
orthodoxy for post-Soviet Georgian national identity, 
combined with upper Adjarans’ increased levels of 
social mobility to other predominantly Christian cities 
and regions within Georgia, have had clear effects on 
many Adjarans’ religious identity. 
Key to the fusion between orthodoxy and 
Georgian nationalism was the era of ‘re-
nationalization’22 ushered in by the decline of the 
Soviet Union, during which an intense nationalist 
discourse arose in many of the ethnically non-Russian 
Soviet successor states. Practitioners of this discourse 
– nationalist dissidents such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
and Merab Kostava in Georgia's case – advanced the 
primacy of a titular nation and its perceived weakness, 
as well as this nation’s inherent right to control state 
mechanisms. Simultaneously, national elites used state 
action as a means of strengthening the position of the 
titular nation. Georgia’s post-Soviet political trajectory 
followed this trend quite closely, as the country’s 1991 
independence saw Gamsakhurdia's accession to the 
presidency and subsequent attempts to reassert state 
control over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, with disastrous results.23  
Crucially, the ‘re-nationalization’ discourse in 
Georgia drew heavily on the country’s orthodox 
traditions. As Zubrzycki notes in his analysis of 
                                                            
22 See Rogers Brubaker, “Nationalizing States Revisited: 
Projects and Processes of Nationalization in Post-Soviet 
States,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies 34 (2011): 1785-1814. 
23 See Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, 
Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, New York 
University Press (2007), pp. 115-151. 
religion in post-Soviet Poland,24 and which is equally 
applicable in Georgia’s case, the symbolic elements of 
the de facto established religion were effectively ‘re-
sacralized.’ In Georgia, this was partly accomplished 
through the introduction of the history of Christianity 
into the public school curriculum in the late 1980s.25 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s 1988 founding of the political-
religious Society of Saint Ilia the Righteous26 as well 
as the baptism of Eduard Shevardnadze in 199227 also 
indicate a greater symbolic role for orthodoxy. 
Generally, the majority of Georgian politicians during 
and after the collapse of the USSR strove to express 
their loyalty to the church.28 
The church’s consolidation as an independent 
power base ensured that orthodoxy would not be 
confined to an exclusively symbolic role in Georgia’s 
wider national consciousness. Already in Soviet times, 
the GOC was the only institution in Georgia formally 
independent of the rigid hierarchy of the Soviet 
system, and the accession of Ilia II to the Patriarchate 
of the GOC in 1978 saw an increase in the 
organization’s activities.29 Following independence, a 
series of legislative actions and informal deals with the 
government greatly enhanced the GOC’s real 
influence. Georgia’s 1995 constitution, while 
guaranteeing freedom of religion, recognized the 
“special role of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its 
independence from the state.”30 The state reached a 
                                                            
24 Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: 
Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland, 
University of Chicago Press (2006). 
25 Simon Papuashvili, “Religious freedom report,” Human 
Rights Centre (HRIDC), 25 April 2008, p. 7. 
26 Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who served as Georgia’s president 
from 1991 until his violent overthrow in 1992, displayed a 
particularly ardent vision of Christianity’s role in Georgian 
national identity. He appointed orthodox priests to powerful 
positions in many of Georgia’s Muslim populated areas, and 
his most famous work, Sakartvelos sulieri missia (Georgia’s 
Spiritual Mission), “depicts Georgian christianity as a 
militant ideology in defense of the nation…as a source of 
Georgia’s ‘special spiritual purpose’…” Stephen F. Jones, 
“Georgia: the trauma of statehood,” in New States, New 
Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations, Ian Bremmer and 
Ray Taras, eds., Cambridge University Press (1997), p. 521. 
27 Lodi News-Sentinel, “Shevardnadze baptized a 
Christian,” 27 February 1993, p. 18. 
28Levan Abashidze,“Das Recht der Religionsgemeinschaften 
in Georgien,“ in Das Recht der Religionsgemeinschaften in 
Mittel-, Ost- und Südeuropa, Wolfgang Lienemann and 
Hans-Richard Reuter, eds.,  
Baden-Baden: Nomos (2005), p. 200. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, Article IX. 
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separate Constitutional Agreement (Concordat) with 
the GOC in 2002, which exempts the church from 
certain taxes and its clergy from military conscription, 
while also compensating the church for property losses 
incurred under Soviet Rule. Additionally, the 
Concordat allows the GOC to collaborate with the state 
regarding the content of the public school curriculum, 
thus essentially giving the church the position of a 
state consultative body.31 Moreover, a number of 
secondary schools were placed under the jurisdiction 
of the GOC during the 1990s.32 
In certain cases, the GOC has been able to act 
as a veritable lobby group with the power to mobilize 
large numbers of its supporters. A notable 2002 case, 
not long after the passage of the Concordat, saw the 
church prevent the signing of an agreement between 
then President Shevardnadze and the Catholic Church 
on the grounds that the agreement lacked transparency 
and would infringe on the GOC’s influence.33 
Recently, the GOC organized mass demonstrations in 
July 2011 in opposition to the passage of a legislative 
amendment allowing for the registration of minority 
religious groups as entities of public law, a technically 
higher legal status than previously afforded to religious 
minority groups. The Holy Synod, the GOC’s main 
decision-making body, issued a statement accusing the 
government for failing to consult with the church prior 
to the amendment’s passage.34 
There exists an extra-constitutional state-
church relationship which has also been significant in 
terms of the GOC’s practical influence. In particular, 
state funding for the church – though technically 
barred by Article IX of the Georgian constitution – has 
reached significant levels in recent years. This funding 
tripled to approximately $15 million in 2009 (with the 
GOC-administered Tbel Abuseridze State University 
in Adjara receiving $1.9 million), and in the same year 
the government gave 10 luxury cars to church officials 
as a sign of goodwill.35 Similarly, the state provided 
                                                            
31 Bert Middel, “State and Religion in the Black Sea 
Region,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 25 May 2008, 
http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1164. 
32 Abashidze, op cit, Ref 25, p. 201. Accordingly, teachers at 
these institutions pay special attentions to subjects such as 
‘Religion’ and ‘Religious Upbringing. 
33 Giorgi Sepashvili, “Brethren in Christ, Divided,” Civil 
Georgia, 29 September 2003, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5019. 
34 “Georgian Orthodox Church softens stance,” Civil 
Georgia, 11 July  2011, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5019. 
35 Molly Corso, “Georgia: Church-State Separation Becomes 
an Issue amid Government Financial Support for Georgian 
Orthodox Church,” EurasiaNet, 7 April 2009,  
around $15 million to the GOC in 2010 and $13.6 
million in 2011, with 2012 projections also hovering at 
$13.6 million.36 The unofficial relationship provides 
some benefits to the state. Considering the GOC’s 
moral authority, positive relations with the church 
confer a higher degree of legitimacy on the state 
(Georgia’s opposition parties likewise court the 
church37). Given the GOC’s ability to mobilize 
supporters in opposition to government policies, 
however, this informal relationship can also be a 
double-edged sword for the state. 
Thus the orthodoxy-nationalism nexus and the 
expansion of the GOC was one of the most 
consequential developments with regards to religious 
identity in Georgia. The new nationalist discourse 
represented a paradigm shift, so to speak, in what it 
meant to be Georgian. In other words, being Georgian 
became increasingly synonymous with subscribing to 
Georgian orthodoxy. While this trend may not have 
posed any problems to the vast majority of Georgia’s 
population – which was and remains orthodox – the 
new national identity paradigm presented much of 
Adjara’s ethnic Georgian Muslim population with a 
religious identity issue.  
In light of Georgia’s post-Soviet nationalist 
trajectory, some residents in upper Adjara began to 
reconfigure their religious orientation in accordance 
with the new “expectations” associated with national 
identity. While initially confined to the lowlands, the 
number of conversions has spread to upper Adjara in 
recent years, particularly in the Keda and Shuakhevi 
districts and to a lesser extent in the Khulo district. 
While this report does not seek to put the genuineness 
of any individual’s or group’s religious convictions in 
question, it does seek to underline certain correlations 
associated with religious transformation. Namely, it 
posits: 1) that religious transformation is most 
prominent among upper Adjara’s middle class as well 
as the younger, more socially mobile segments of the 
region’s population; 2) that geography is inherent to 
the transformation process, as Christianity has made 
inroads in the accessible administrative centres of 
upper Adjara, while Islam remains dominant in the 
region’s isolated villages; and 3) that Adjara’s cultural 
                                                                                                       
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav
040609b.shtml. 
36 “State Budget Assigned sums for Spending 
Organizations,” Parliamentary Budget Office of Georgia, 
http://www.pbo.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec
_id=59. 
37 “Opposition parties condemn religious groups’ legal 
status law,” Civil Georgia, 6 July 2011, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23708. 
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and ethnic association with Georgia has facilitated the 
conversion process and, in many cases, led to the 
primacy of national identity over religious identity 
even among many of the region’s Muslims. 
Among upper Adjara’s middle class 
population, which consists largely of teachers, doctors, 
and local cadres, certain trends toward religious 
transformation have surfaced in the last two decades. 
Full conversion to Christianity is not uncommon for 
those segments of middle class society coming of age 
around the period of Georgia’s nationalist mobilization 
in the early 1990s. Even older middle class residents in 
upper Adjara have partially followed suit; though they 
seldom convert to Christianity, their Muslim identity 
tends to be relatively weak and levels of personal 
religiosity remain low, and they often have Christian 
children and/or grandchildren. 
Middle class conversions to Christianity and 
weak Muslim identity can be traced largely to the 
seven decades of state-supported atheism under the 
Soviet Union. There was a conspicuous lack of 
religious activity in public life during the Soviet years, 
and religion was not a high priority even in middle 
class private life in upper Adjara. Interviews with 
teachers in Khulo-Centre, for example, indicate a lack 
of Muslim upbringing among the middle class at that 
time. As one Christian teacher stated, “It’s not as if I 
was ever truly Muslim. I never read the Koran or knew 
the tenets of Islam, and I didn’t even know how to 
pray.”38 Such conversions often took place around 
1991,39 thus suggesting that the intersection between 
weak Muslim upbringing and the onset of Georgia’s 
period of nationalist mobilization facilitated the 
conversion process. 
For the most part, Muslim identity has never 
been particularly strong even among older members of 
middle class society in upper Adjara.40 While many 
older doctors and teachers recognize Islam as their 
traditional confession, their observance of the religion 
in everyday life is usually low and confined to major 
                                                            
38 Other teachers corroborated this statement, saying that 
parents often failed to teach their children about Islam under 
Soviet rule. Interview at Khulo secondary school, 26 
October 2011. 
39 Interviews at Khulo secondary school, 26 and 27 October 
2011. 
40 Conversely, those older segments of upper Adjara’s 
population which do not hail from the middle class tend to 
exhibit higher rates of religiosity. When discussing Adjara’s 
religious matters with younger people and Christians in 
upper Adjara, many expressed that only old people go to the 
mosques and practice Islam on a regular basis. Of course, 
the category ‘old people’ fails to take class differences into 
account, but the sentiment is nevertheless revealing. 
religious holidays such as Kurban-Bayram. In fact, 
when discussing personal religious matters with older 
middle class Adjarans one is unlikely to hear specific 
references to Islam. Rather, the phrase “there is only 
one god, and that’s what is most important” is quite 
common, thus reflecting a genuine religious conviction 
without religious dogmatism.41 This segment of upper 
Adjara’s population tends to place national identity 
above Islam and in many cases does not view the 
spread of orthodoxy in a negative light.42 
Religious transformation has shown similar 
patterns among the younger sections of upper Adjara’s 
population, though with considerably higher rates of 
conversion to Christianity. Key to the youth 
conversion process is the intersection between social 
mobility and the orthodoxy-associated brand of 
national identity so prominent throughout the rest of 
Georgia. Specifically, young Muslims in upper Adjara 
can usually retain their religious beliefs as long as they 
remain in their local surroundings. However, if they 
move to Batumi or another region of Georgia to seek 
out higher education and employment opportunities, 
there is usually pressure to reconfigure their religious 
beliefs so as to avoid social exclusion.43 
The economic situation in upper Adjara is a major 
push factor for young Adjarans to move to other parts 
of Georgia, thus also constituting an indirect catalyst 
for conversions. The region’s economy is largely based 
on agriculture, with major activities including animal 
husbandry and the cultivation of potatoes, beans, corn, 
and tobacco.44 Additionally, any industrial base the 
region had during the Soviet period has largely 
disappeared. The administrative centres of Khulo and 
                                                            
41 Interviews in Didadjara (9 December 2011) and Riketi (12 
December 2011). 
42 An older Muslim teacher in Riketi’s secondary school 
expressed positive opinions about the construction of 
churches in the Khulo district, describing the region’s 
religious transformations as Adjara’s ‘return’ to Georgia 
proper. 
43 One anecdote cited by the district head of Khulo’s Muslim 
boarding schools is especially indicative of youth 
conversions and Muslim leaders’ perceptions of this trend: 
“Young people don’t know why they change their religion. 
Once I met a student who converted from Islam to 
Christianity. I asked him the reason for his decision and he 
said his friends were Christians. Then I asked him why he 
bothered to convert in the first place if he never intended to 
go to church or lead a Christian life, and he didn’t have an 
answer for that. In my opinion he did it to appear better in 
his friends’ view, and many young people make similar 
mistakes. They change their beliefs for the sake of others.” 
Interview at Khulo muftiate, 28 October 2011. 
44 Interview at Khulo secondary school, 26 October 2011. 
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Shuakhevi once hosted textile and juice factories, 
respectively, both of which were closed following 
independence.45 Moreover, higher education in upper 
Adjara is not an option except for the GOC-
administered Tbel Absuseridze State University in the 
Shuakhevi district. Thus local wages remain low, 
poverty is common, and opportunities for social 
mobility strictly within upper Ajara are limited. As a 
result, the majority of young Adjarans opt for 
education and work opportunities elsewhere in 
Georgia.46 
In certain instances, young Adjarans return to 
their villages following the completion of higher 
education.47 Yet, in those cases where Adjarans remain 
in the cities, they usually convert to Christianity or 
simply lose their Muslim identity. This trend was 
mentioned in almost every interview and focus group 
during fieldwork trips to upper Adjara from October-
December 2011. As Khulo’s mufti Aslan Abashidze 
described, “There is little land here and when two or 
three siblings live in the same house, economic 
problems often arise. They get tired of rural life, move 
to the city, and see how other Georgians lead their 
[religious] lives. Many subsequently choose Christian 
beliefs in order to fit in with their friends and 
neighbors in the cities.”48 
Accordingly, there is an inherent geographical 
component to the religious transformation process in 
upper Adjara. Christianity’s dominance in Batumi and 
in other regions of Georgia is an obvious geographical 
element of the conversion process, especially when 
viewed in light of younger Adjarans’ migratory 
patterns to the cities. Concomitantly, geographical 
considerations within Adjara are also important in 
relation to religious transformation, as the 
preponderance toward conversion tends to break down 
along a number of relatively clear boundaries in the 
region. 
In general, the expansion of Christianity in 
upper Adjara can be linked to district administrative 
centres as well as a particular settlement’s position 
along major thoroughfares and historic trade routes. 
Indeed, many of the region’s most prominent Christian 
sites are located along the infrastructurally sound 
                                                            
45 Interviews at Shuakhevi (7 December 2011) and Khulo 
(10 December 2011). 
46 Out of a recent graduating class of 20 from Didadjara’s 
secondary school, 13 went to university in other Georgian 
cities. Interviews at Khulo secondary school (27 October 
2011) and Didadjara secondary school (9 December 2011). 
47 Interviews at Didadjara secondary school (9 December 
2011) and Riketi secondary school (12 December 2011). 
48 Imam focus group at Khulo muftiate, 1 November 2011. 
section of the historic Batumi-Akhaltsikhe highway, 
with the GOC-administered Tbel Abuseridze State 
University in Khichauri and a new orthodox church in 
Khulo-Centre counting among the most dominant 
Christian places.49 One Adjaran government official 
also cited Skhalta – the home of medieval humanist 
Tbel Abuseridze and the current seat of the Skhalta 
eparchy – as a settlement along an ancient trade route 
with historically higher observance of Christianity and 
comparatively lower observance of Islam.50 
Conversely, any excursion into the villages off 
the main Batumi-Akhaltsikhe highway or east of 
Khulo-Centre51 illustrates a religious landscape still 
dominated by upper Adjara’s Muslim traditions. In 
such isolated and less developed settlements, 
traditional family structures and lifestyles have largely 
remained intact, and there is almost no sign of shifting 
religious identities. Accordingly, essentially no 
Muslim families in locations such as Didadjara, 
Duadzeebi, Uchkho, Gurta, or Riketi have opted to 
convert. Ghorjomi, an isolated community located a 
considerable distance from the main road, is especially 
renowned for its adherence to Islamic traditions and its 
proliferation of mosques and madrassahs.52 Moreover, 
Islamic charitable traditions such as vazife, oshori, and 
zekat are still widely practiced throughout rural 
Khulo.53 Thus even if social mobility among young 
upper Adjarans often entails conversion to 
Christianity, Islam remains the dominant religion 
within the rural communities of the region. 
                                                            
49 It bears mentioning that the administrative centre of 
Shuakhevi, which is located on the Batumi-Akhaltsihe 
highway, has no mosques. The settlement’s cultural centre 
doubles as an orthodox church on Sundays. Interview at 
Shuakhevi cultural centre, 7 December 2011.  
50 Interview at Adjaran Parliament, Batumi, 5 December 
2011. 
51 Village roads are almost always unpaved and difficult to 
navigate. The Batumi-Akhaltsikhe road – almost all of 
which is paved between Batumi and Khulo-Centre – turns 
into little more than a potholed dirt track immediately east of 
Khulo-Centre. Additionally, avalanches are a serious travel 
hazard in the region, and it is not uncommon for boulders to 
fall onto the main road. Sheer isolation and navigability 
problems have arguably contributed to the preservation of 
Islam in so much of the Khulo district.  
52 Baramidze, op cit, Ref 19, pp. 13-15. 
53 These traditions entail the collection of food and 
donations from residents, the donation of a percentage of 
personally grown natural products to financially troubled 
families, and the donation of money by richer residents to 
those in need, respectively. Interview with mufti Aslan 
Abashidze in Khulo, 8 December 2011. 
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Finally, religious transformation in upper Adjara is 
significantly influenced by the fact that the region is – 
ethnically and culturally speaking – undoubtedly 
Georgian. Unlike Azeris in Kvemo Kartli and Kists in 
Pankisi, who have clear ethnic and cultural cleavages 
opposite the titular Georgian nation and thus have a 
distinct cultural basis for the preservation of their 
Islamic traditions, Adjarans are ethnically Georgian. 
The residents speak Georgian as a first language, and 
many families throughout the region retain distinct 
Georgian cultural customs such as the local production 
of wine and the traditional spirit chacha.54 Indeed, 
Georgian drinking culture is strong among much of 
upper Adjara’s middle class and local cadres, whose 
sense of Georgian national identity generally takes 
precedence over their Islamic beliefs.55 However, it is 
worth noting that daily non-adherence to normative 
Islamic beliefs is not peculiar to the middle class.56 
Identity with the Georgian nation and 
observance of Georgian customs do not seem to entail 
a contradiction for those segments of upper Adjara’s 
population which retain a weaker association with 
Islam. Even a certain feeling of solidarity with the 
GOC as a Georgian cultural institution is not 
uncommon among upper Adjara’s middle class 
Muslims. The majority of such Muslims are quick to 
underline their loyalty to the Georgian nation, and they 
have a genuine respect for religious choice (i.e. 
conversion from Islam to Christianity). Thus the 
primacy that national identity enjoys among many 
Adjaran Muslims has, at the very least, provided 
something of a basis for religious transformation in the 
direction of orthodoxy.  
                                                            
54 Interview in Khulo, 10 December 2011. In this case, an 
older Muslim in Khulo described in detail the methods he 
followed for brewing wine. ECMI fieldwork in Riketi also 
revealed that many local residents brew large amounts of 
chacha. On countless occasions, Muslim residents in upper 
Adjara were seen partaking in the type of communal 
drinking traditions common throughout Georgia. 
55 Numerous discussions with middle class residents in 
upper Adjara, for example, indicated an undeniably 
nationalist orientation in the analysis of history. Such 
segments of society sharply criticize the Ottoman conquest 
of Adjara and are quick to make reference to the amount of 
Georgian ‘territory’ currently under Turkish control, a clear 
reference to Georgian hegemony in eastern Anatolia in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
56 When asked about the slaying of a wild boar in Riketi and 
whether eating pork posed problems for the local Muslim 
population, one local exclaimed, “We would be crazy not to 
eat the boar! Where else can we get such high quality 
meat?” 
Nevertheless, the transformation process 
toward orthodoxy is not to discount other religious 
considerations in upper Adjara. Among the region’s 
Muslim leaders and the more religious segments of 
upper Adjaran society, leading a normative Georgian 
lifestyle – complete with alcohol and orthodoxy – 
entails an inherent contradiction with their Muslim 
beliefs. To be sure, these segments of the population 
view themselves as Georgian and are consistent in 
expressing support for the development of a civic 
nationalism whereby their loyalty to the nation will not 
be questioned as a result of their divergent religious 
beliefs. However, many Muslim leaders express 
frustration with the religious expectations that the 
dominant nationalist discourse entails.57 As discussed 
below, there is also a movement among the more 
religious segments of upper Adjaran society to 
preserve their Islamic traditions while retaining loyalty 
to the Georgian nation. 
 
V. THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL 
INSTITUTIONS ON RELIGIOUS 
IDENTITY IN UPPER ADJARA 
 
While structural developments are an important 
explanatory factor for identity transformation in upper 
Adjara, local actors and institutions are also crucial in 
shaping religious identity in the region. To this end, 
the following three institutional categories are 
especially relevant: 1) the GOC and GOC-affiliated 
institutions; 2) public secondary schools; and 3) local 
mosques, madrassahs, and independent Islamic 
organizations. Each institution offers educational 
services, thus each is able to effectively convey its 
particular religious conception to Adjara’s population, 
especially to young students. Additionally, sources of 
funding and relations with the state differ among these 
institutions. The GOC – with its broad administrative 
and consultative prerogatives in the field of public 
education and significant amounts of state funding – 
enjoys an advantage over privately funded Islamic 






                                                            
57 Imam focus group at Khulo muftiate, 1 November 2011; 
interview with mufti Jemal Paksadze, Batumi, 13 December 
2011. 
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5.1 The GOC in Upper Adjara: Church 
Expansion through Education 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union created an 
environment in which religious institutions could 
operate with unprecedented levels of freedom. The 
Georgian Orthodox Church, as covered earlier in this 
report, benefited especially from the ‘re-
nationalization’ of the Georgian state and the 
complementary relationship which developed between 
Georgian national identity and orthodoxy under the 
Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze regimes. Adjara, 
despite its autonomous status derived from the 
dominant religion of Sunni Islam, was no exception to 
this trend. With help from the authorities in Tbilisi and 
an initially pliable regional government in Batumi, the 
GOC embarked on a campaign of conversion in Adjara 
throughout the 1990s. This process was particularly 
widespread in lower Adjara, specifically in Batumi and 
along the coastline. Tellingly, 14 Christian churches 
became active in Batumi after independence, whereas 
the city boasts only one functioning mosque.58 
The GOC extended its influence into the 
administrative centres of upper Adjara in the early 
1990s as well, though with a weaker presence than in 
the lowlands. According to an orthodox priest in 
Khulo, the degree to which the GOC actively spreads 
its message in the area is limited: “It’s very hard to get 
locals to believe in Christianity because Turkey 
finances so many Islamic institutions in the area. The 
church is also not very active in the villages around 
Khulo. Sometimes we send missionaries here and 
there, but it’s rare.”59 However, other orthodox 
organizations have been active in the area during the 
post-Soviet years. Though currently not operational, 
the group ‘Orthodox Parents’ Union’ was known for 
its aggressive propagation of orthodoxy in Adjara and 
other traditionally Muslim areas in Georgia, which 
included planting crosses near non-orthodox places of 
worship and releasing antagonistic statements against 
other confessions.60  
                                                            
58 Sanikidze and Walker, op cit, Ref 14, p. 13. Muslim 
leaders in Khulo indicated a desire for the opening of a 
second mosque in Batumi, though the government has not 
seriously supported the plan to date. 
59 Interview at GOC-administered secondary school, Khulo, 
18 October 2011. 
60 Incidentally, ‘Orthodox Parents’ Union’ has recently been 
disbanded. The organization’s website is no longer 
available, and eight of its members are currently in prison. 
Interview with Beka Mindiashvili, Tbilisi, 28 November 
2011. 
The current lack of direct proselytizing 
notwithstanding, the GOC has been able to spread its 
message through the administration of several key 
education institutions and the construction of churches. 
In 1991, a new church was constructed in Khulo and 
the Gamsakhurdia government transferred jurisdiction 
of the town’s internat residential school to the GOC. 
Located beside each other in a gated off area a short 
distance above the town centre, the church-school 
combination constitutes the GOC’s primary 
institutional presence in the Khulo district. The school 
initially served as a secondary school, vocational 
school, and seminary, though vocational training was 
eventually scaled back and now the school fulfills 
mainly secondary education functions. The school is 
open to both Christians and Muslims, though its 
orientation in terms of religion is undoubtedly 
Christian as, according to one teacher there, “above all 
our school teaches Christian beliefs, the beliefs of 
Jesus Christ.”61 Additionally, the school hosts a 
kindergarten, where all children, regardless of religious 
background, receive blessings from resident priests.62 
GOC-affiliated education institutions are not confined 
to Khulo. At a prominent September 2009 ceremony 
attended by high-ranking GOC and Adjaran 
government officials, the Tbel Abuseridze State 
University was launched in the village of Khichauri in 
the Shuakhevi district.63 Located on the grounds of a 
former military base and administered by the GOC, the 
university initially accepted 331 students primarily 
from upper Adjara and now hosts approximately 500 
university students.64 The university offers a typical 
selection of bachelor (Georgian philology, Georgian 
history, art, pedagogy, journalism, public 
administration, business administration, and medicine) 
and MA courses (Georgian history, public education 
management, Georgian literature, linguistics, 
journalism, and archaeology). Significantly, tuition and 
meals are completely free for the institution’s Adjaran 
students.65 This policy is an exception among Georgian 
state universities, as other public universities in the 
                                                            
61 Interview with internat school literature teacher, Khulo, 
17 October 2011.  
62 Interview in Khulo, 1 November 2011. 
63 “Official opening of Tbel Abuseridze State University 




64 A GOC-administered secondary school located adjacent to 
the university accommodates around 700 pupils. 
65 Interview at Tbel Abuseridze State University, Khichauri, 
7 December 2011. 
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country charge tuition regardless of students’ home 
region.66 
Given its status as a public institution, the 
university is officially neutral with regards to religion.  
However, the primacy of orthodoxy is clear in the 
institution’s administration, as the faculty is dominated 
by orthodox priests from other regions of Georgia. 
Orthodoxy also figures significantly in the instruction 
of history. One priest and history instructor stated that 
one of the goals of the university’s history program is 
to “teach the correct facts” about religion in Adjara, 
which means treating orthodoxy as an essentially 
primordial aspect of Adjara’s history, portraying Islam 
as a historical aberration precipitated by the Ottoman 
conquest, and emphasizing the need for the region to 
return to Georgia, so to speak, through conversion to 
Christianity.67 
Another result of the GOC's expansion into 
upper Adjara is the accelerated construction of 
churches in the area. Notably, the construction of a 
new orthodox cathedral was begun in 2010 in Khulo-
Centre. Perched on a prominent spot above the 
Batumi-Akhaltsikhe highway, the structure is 
scheduled for completion in 2012 and will become the 
second orthodox church in the district’s administrative 
centre. The pace of church construction has likewise 
quickened in Shuakhevi, where a church was recently 
finished in the village of Oladauri.68 A new church is 
also in the process of construction on the grounds of 
Tbel Abuseridze State University. 
While many Muslims in upper Adjara do not 
seem to resent the construction of churches per se, 
some Muslim leaders express dissatisfaction with what 
they perceive as the state's preference for the GOC, 
specifically with regards to material support for church 
                                                            
66 Interview at Didadjara secondary school, 9 December 
2011. 
67 This view was corroborated by several university students. 
According to the same priest, emphasis is placed on this 
particular conception of Adjaran history because many of 
the region’s youth pursue state-funded higher education in 
Turkey. In addition to developing a stronger sense of Islamic 
identity in Turkish universities, Adjaran students apparently 
receive instruction about Adjaran history which runs 
contrary to that imparted by the GOC. Interviews at Tbel 
Abuseridze State University, Khichauri, 7 December 2011. 
68 The church’s inauguration was attended by Archbishop 
Dimitri of the Batumi and Skhalta Diocese, along with 
several high-ranking Adjaran government officials. 
Moreover, 200 locals were christened during the church's 
opening. “Church Opened in Shuakhevi,” Government of 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara, 
http://www.ajara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=show&id=218
. 
construction. One prominent Muslim leader in Khulo 
stated:  
 
“We don’t have a problem with the new 
church in Khulo, we want that to continue. 
But why is it that crosses can be seen all 
over our roads and in our villages? Why do 
they say that new churches must be built on 
every beautiful spot in Adjara when the 
population of Khulo is 99 percent Muslim? 
The church continues to receive help from 
the state, but we don’t receive financial 
support for the renovation or upkeep of our 
mosques.”69 
 
Though the demographic figure of 99 percent Muslim 
is questionable given the number of conversions and 
the general lack of recent religious data in the area, a 
disparity in terms of state support for religious 
institutions is undeniable. As the specialist in religious 
issues, professor George Sanikidze stated, “Orthodoxy 
is financed, Islam is not.” According to Sanikidze, the 
state’s pro-orthodox funding tendencies are especially 
apparent in Khulo, where, in addition to the 
construction of a new church, the clergy’s cars are 
financed by the state.70 
The GOC’s influence in upper Adjara seems 
likely to increase with additional church construction 
and continued GOC administration of key education 
institutions. This trend is not necessarily viewed as 
negative by much of the region’s population, as GOC-
affiliated education institutions generally have a 
reputation for competent instructors and high quality 
education.71 Nevertheless, the exclusive focus of GOC-
affiliated schools on Christianity and the Christian 
aspects of Georgian and Adjaran history will likely 
lead to more conversions among younger segments of 
upper Adjara’s population, thus accelerating the 
decline of the region’s Islamic traditions. 
 
5.2 Public Education in Upper Adjara: 
Implicit Orthodoxy 
 
Public secondary schools also play an important role in 
shaping religious identity in upper Adjara, though in a 
decidedly more balanced manner. Given their 
proliferation throughout the region and the various 
socio-economic and religious dichotomies among their 
                                                            
69 Interview at Khulo muftiate, 31 October 2011. 
70 Interview with professor Geroge Sanikidze, Tbilisi, 11 
November 2011. 
71 Interview in Khulo, 12 October 2011. 
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student bodies, public schools cater for a wider cross-
section of upper Adjara’s population. In the Khulo 
district, the GOC plays no direct role in the running of 
most public schools or the formulation of public 
education curriculum. At any rate, public schools are 
officially neutral with regards to religious matters as a 
result of the official separation of church and state 
policy defined in Georgia’s constitution.72  
Moreover, interviews and discussion groups in 
secondary schools in Khulo-Centre, Didadjara, and 
Riketi indicate essentially unanimous support among 
both Muslim and Christian school teachers for 
religious tolerance and freedom of religious choice. 
The director of Khulo-Centre’s secondary school, a 
Muslim from the village of Didadjara, stated that the 
institution’s religious diversity has never posed any 
problems in her five years as director. 
Correspondingly, several teachers indicated that it is 
not unusual for Muslim parents to have both a Bible 
and a Koran, so as to let their children read both and 
make their own religious choices.73 Teachers in all 
three of the abovementioned locations are likewise 
supportive of freedom of religious choice among 
young people. 
This sense of tolerance and objectivity is 
certainly genuine. It demonstrates the generally 
positive relations between religious groups in the area, 
particularly among middle class sectors of the 
population which tend more toward secularism. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the public school 
curriculum in upper Adjara reflect a slight preference 
for orthodoxy, particularly in the instruction of 
Georgian history. Given the structural factors outlined 
earlier in this paper, this trend is not entirely 
surprising. That the 2002 Concordat grants the GOC 
major consultative prerogatives in the field of public 
education curriculum likewise explains why orthodoxy 
has a slightly higher standing in institutions of public 
education.74 
Most school teachers readily recognize orthodoxy’s 
place in the curriculum, as the majority of religious 
questions in history textbooks deal with Christianity. 
Accordingly, teachers in Khulo indicate a particularly 
strong textbook emphasis on Saint Nino, who they say 
                                                            
72 Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, Article IX. 
73 Interview with Khulo secondary school director, 26 
October 2011. 
74 In upper Adjara, the GOC has several clear prerogatives in 
terms of public education. Aside from those officially state 
schools under orthodox administration, the GOC administers 
and funds preparatory exam training for secondary students 
in Didadjara, Skhalta, and Khichauri. Interview at Didadjara 
secondary school, 9 December 2011. 
converted to Christianity in 332 AD in the village of 
Didadjara. Textbooks also cover the story of St. 
Andrew, who is likewise alleged to have been an 
active Christian missionary in Adjara. The instruction 
of history thus assumes Christianity as a primordial 
aspect of Adjara’s history, with one history teacher 
claiming that “Adjara led the rest of Georgia to 
Christianity.”75 
Students corroborated orthodoxy’s place in the 
history curriculum. Gio, a Christian student in the 
eleventh class, indicated that his class’s history 
textbook – and history instruction in general – referred 
to Christianity as the ‘true religion.’76 This is not to the 
exclusion of other religions in the curriculum, as 
textbooks address non-orthodox confessions and 
traditions as well. According to the director of Khulo's 
secondary school, the school offers a separate 
“Religion and Geography” course, in which students 
learn about various religions throughout the world.77 
Nevertheless, many instructors and students seem to 
view religion with the assumption that Christianity is a 
primordial element of Adjara’s history. 
This assumption is reinforced by how teachers view 
the three centuries during which Adjara was under 
Ottoman rule. The region’s Ottoman history is seen by 
many – even a considerable number of Muslims – with 
some degree of disdain. A Muslim history teacher 
described the conversion process under the Ottomans 
as such: 
 
“There is a book called Vakhtang Zoidze 
(Ardent Patriots) which describes how the 
Turks led Christians to the river 
Chorokhistskali. Threatening them with their 
swords, the Turks made the Christians trample 
on their own icons – otherwise they would 
have to cross the river – and told them ‘let 
your Christ save you now.’ It was only in 
seventeenth century that Georgians [Adjarans] 
were forced to become Muslims, and of course 
                                                            
75 Interview in Khulo secondary school, 26 October 2011. It 
should likewise be noted that teachers in Didadjara (9 
December 2011) and Riketi (12 December 2011) confirmed 
the instruction of this history in their respective schools. 
76 Interview in Khulo, 12 October 2011. 
77 During the 1990s and much of the early 2000s, a course 
by the title of ‘Religious Upbringing’ was also taught in 
secondary schools. Most Muslims viewed this course as 
propaganda on the part of the GOC, as it dealt specifically 
with the present role of orthodoxy and its place in Georgian 
history. However, the course was discontinued 
approximately six years ago. Interview at Adjaran 
parliament, Batumik, 5 December 2011.  
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Georgians remember it more painfully. That 
memory has remained in Georgians’ minds 
and made them hate this religion [Islam].”78 
 
Still other stories from Adjara’s Ottoman past 
influence how history is taught and how religion – at 
least implicitly – is viewed. Multiple references were 
made to a bridge in the Shuakhevi district, which was 
allegedly used by Ottoman authorities to execute 
Christians who refused to convert to Islam.79 Many 
teachers also stated that Adjarans secretly kept their 
Christian traditions following mass conversions to 
Islam, a prime example being mchata, a type of bread 
with a cross cut into the top “so as to not forget our 
Christian past.” An additional claim is that Khulo’s 
present-day mosque was originally a church before the 
Ottoman invasion and thus retains the shape of a 
cross.80 
There is no doubt that religious subjects are 
covered in a more balanced manner in public 
secondary schools in upper Adjara. Moreover, 
relations between Muslims and Christians in Khulo’s 
secondary school – where the greatest religious mix is 
likely to be found in upper Adjara – are quite good. 
Nevertheless, one is able to detect a slight bias toward 
Christianity in the instruction of history. Christianity is 
mostly conveyed as a primordial element of Adjara’s 
history, while the history of Islam in the region is most 
often associated with the Ottoman conquest. Whereas 
these historical elements may hold some truth, the 
manner in which they are conveyed entails a judgment, 
however implicit, on the place and worth of each 
religion in the area. Thus by staking a primordial claim 
for Christianity while simultaneously associating 
Islam’s history in Adjara with Turkish rule, the 
curriculum of public schools may in fact be providing 
the ideological base for conversions to Christianity 
among the younger segments of upper Adjara’s 
population. 
 
                                                            
78 Teacher focus group at Khulo secondary school, 26 
October 2011. 
79 Teacher focus group at Khulo secondary school, 27 
October 2011. Accordingly, so many Christians were 
apparently executed at this site that the river “ran red with 
blood.” In the course of research, however, no written record 
or reference of this event was found. 
80 This particular story seems questionable, as it would mean 
that the structure in question dates to the seventeenth 
century or earlier. Any visitor to the mosque can see that the 
mosque is not that old. Moreover, religion scholar Ruslan 
Baramidze (Batumi State University) puts the building’s 
date at approximately 1829. 
5.3 Local Mosques, Madrassahs, and 
Independent Muslim Organizations 
Mosques, madrassahs, and independent Muslim 
organizations constitute the third institutional category 
active in affecting religious identity in upper Adjara. 
This report has thus far focused on orthodox and  
public education institutions. Yet, it is a gross 
misstatement to suggest that Islamic institutions are 
inactive in upper Adjara.  
Parallel to the experience of the GOC in the 
region, Moscow’s weakening grip on power in the 
union republics in the late 1980s and the subsequent 
collapse of the Soviet Union gave impetus to Muslim 
mobilization in upper Adjara. Though local authorities 
were initially reluctant to support the reestablishment 
of Muslim institutions, the accession of Aslan 
Abashidze to the chairmanship of the Adjaran 
government in 1991 ultimately facilitated more 
balanced government-Islam relations81 and the 
proliferation of Muslim organizations in the region.82 
New mosques were opened, new religious 
organizations were formed, and new contacts were 
made with Islamic organizations in Turkey and the 
Arab world.83 However, rifts within the Adjaran 
Muslim community have caused the growth in Islamic 
activities to be asymmetric and uncoordinated. 
According to a 2010 religious institution census 
released by the Niko Berdzenishvili Institute in 
Batumi, there are currently 184 active Muslim 
buildings in Adjara. Of these buildings, 119 are 
mosques (51 with an attached madrassah and nine 
with an attached madrassah-boarding school), 22 are 
seasonal mosques, 19 are free-standing madrassahs, 15 
are prayer houses (i.e. mosques lacking key 
architectural/symbolic components), eight are 
madrassah-boarding schools, and one is a prayer 
house-madrassah. Khulo boasts more functioning 
Muslim religious buildings (77) than any other district 
                                                            
81 Interview with religion expert Levan Abashidze, Tbilisi, 
29 November 2011. 
82 A descendent of Muslim Adjaran noblemen, Abashidze 
subsequently made an alliance with upper Adjaran Muslim 
leaders to retain power in the mid-1990s, transforming 
Adjara into a personal fiefdom. Simultaneously, he publicly 
courted the GOC and maintained minimal oversight over its 
activities in the region. 
83 See Pelkmans (2006) for a detailed overview of Muslim 
mobilization in the 1990s. 
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in Adjara, followed by Shuakhevi (46), Keda (20), 
Khelvachauri (17), and Kobuleti (17).84 
Accordingly, opportunities for basic religious 
schooling in the region have increased in the last two 
decades, despite institutions of Muslim education 
never having been a traditional part of Muslim life in 
upper Adjara.85 Many mosques in the region are 
accompanied by madrassahs, usually comprised of a 
separate classroom within the mosque with religious 
texts and learning materials. These basic madrassahs 
offer Muslim educational services to locals, who can 
voluntarily take part in classes on weekends.86 The 
village of Ghorjomi in western Khulo boasts an 
especially high density of mosques and madrassahs in 
relation to population. 
More consequential with regards to religious 
education are boarding school-madrassahs, of which 
there are two in Khulo-Centre and approximately four 
in the rest of the Khulo district (Ghorjomi, Beghleti, 
Skhalta, and Khikhadziri).87 Supported by Islamic 
charitable organizations with funding from Turkey, 
each school provides free room and board and hosts 
between 30-50 students, almost all of whom come 
from poorer families from upper Adjara’s rural 
villages. Islamic schools do not function as a substitute 
for public education, as all students also attend public 
secondary schools. Each day after secondary school, 
however, madrassah students continue their studies 
with religious education and a select few secular 
subjects.88 As such schools are neither state funded nor 
officially registered as educational institutions, there 
                                                            
84 Ruslan Baramidze, “Active Muslim Religious and 
Teaching Buildings – Adjaran Autonomous Republic”, Niko 
Berdzenishvili Institute, 2010. 
85 Even under Ottoman rule, few religious education 
institutions were established. Rather, Adjarans typically 
received religious training and education in Istanbul. 
Interview at Adjaran parliament, Batumi, 5 December 2011. 
86 Interview with mufti Aslan Abashidze, Duadzeebi, 31 
October 2011. 
87 Interview with mufti Aslan Abashidze, Khulo, 8 
December 2011. 
88 According to the regional director of Khulo’s Muslim 
boarding schools, students study religion for one and a half 
hours each day, focusing mainly on “the stories of 
Muhammad, the conditions of Muslims in early times, and 
also what role Islam can play in their future lives.” 
Christianity, though obviously not espoused in the boarding 
schools, is briefly addressed. Additionally, select secular 
subjects and exam preparation are a common element in 
these schools. Interview at Khulo muftiate, 28 October 
2011. 
are currently no mechanisms to review the content or 
quality of instruction.89 
In terms of administration, Muslim affairs in 
Adjara officially fall under the auspices of the regional 
muftiate, or board of spiritual affairs, in Batumi. 
Chaired by Jemal Paksadze, the mufti of both Adjara 
and Georgia’s wider Muslim community, Adjara’s 
muftiate is tasked with addressing religious problems 
and general issues of religious importance in the 
region. This administrative structure is similarly 
replicated on the district level. Each district in Adjara 
has its own muftiate and mufti responsible for 
corresponding with district imams, who lead prayers in 
individual mosques. In turn, district muftis report any 
religious issues in their respective areas of supervision 
to the muftiate in Batumi. 
Nevertheless, relations between the official 
muftiate and district muftiates are not always in 
accordance. Specifically, some Muslim leaders in 
Adjara’s districts opine that the official muftiate in 
Batumi maintains excessively close relations with the 
government and thus lacks neutrality in religious 
affairs.90 While the situation does not constitute a 
schism, there seems to be a lack of coordination and 
communication between the official muftiate in 
Batumi and the Muslim administrations in the districts. 
Given the somewhat dysfunctional administrative 
situation, local Muslim institutions in Adjara largely 
rely on independent charitable Muslim organizations 
active in the region. These organizations include the 
Association of Aid for Georgian Youth (SADA), 
Madli-2005, the Union of Theologians, the Association 
of Translation of the Koran in Georgian and Scientific 
Research, the Union of Georgian Muslims, and the 
Association of friendship between Georgia and 
Turkey. In the absence of government funding for 
nearly all Muslim institutions, such organizations play 
a key role for the functioning of mosques and 
madrassahs. Partnerships between Muslim 
organizations and mosques, madrassahs, and district-
level muftiates entail financial support for mosque 
construction and renovation, the functioning of 
Muslim boarding schools, and the supplying of food 
on major Islamic holidays.91 
Not all independent Islamic organizations 
enjoy stellar relations with the official muftiate either. 
As with many local Islamic institutions in Adjara’s 
                                                            
89 Interview with professor Ruslan Baramidze, Batumi, 6 
December 2011. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The organization Madli-2005, for example, is responsible 
for administering the six boarding school-madrassahs in the 
Khulo district mentioned above. 
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districts, some of these organizations view the muftiate 
as a veritable extension of the government.92 Likewise, 
relations among these Islamic organizations are often 
out of sync owing largely to divergent theological 
opinions. According to one Adjaran government 
official, such theological disagreements are harmful 
because they ultimately lead to fractures among 
Adjara’s Muslim community. Accordingly, there tends 
to be relatively little cooperation between Islamic 
organizations on major religious holidays, as each 
plans its own celebrations and has little or no 
interaction with other organizations.93 
With the lack of state funding for Islamic 
institutions and organizations in Adjara, outside 
sources of funding and support are crucial. Turkey 
plays a central role in the financing of Muslim 
organizations and, by extension, the operation of local 
Muslim institutions. For example, each Georgian 
Muslim organization is linked with a Turkish religious 
foundation responsible for channeling financial and 
material support.94 The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
(Presidency of Religious Affairs) – the highest official 
Islamic authority in Turkey – likewise supports 
Adjara’s Muslim community. Namely, the Diyanet 
cooperates with the region's spiritual board and 
encourages young Adjaran Muslims to study religion 
in Turkey.95 Additionally, private Turkish citizens – 
often members of Turkey’s ethnic Georgian 
community – provide significant amounts of financial 
                                                            
92 There are exceptions to this trend. The official muftiate 
enjoys good relations with SADA, and there is even some 
overlap in personnel between the two entities.  
93 Interview at Adjaran parliament, Batumi, 5 December 
2011. 
94 Interview with professor Ruslan Baramidze, Batumi, 6 
December 2011. 
95 The Diyanet is responsible for convening the Eurasian 
Islamic Council (EIC), which began in 1995 and is intended 
to facilitate cooperation between spiritual boards throughout 
the Muslim areas of the former Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia. The seventh EIC (2009), for example, passed a 
resolution to translate and publish Islamic literature in a 
number of native languages. In 2008, the Diyanet published 
six thousand copies of a booklet called “I am Learning my 
Religion” in Georgian, along with other booklets such as “I 
am Learning about my Book” and “I am Learning about my 
Prophet.” Moreover, the Diyanet has played an important 
role in Muslim education. In 2008, the organization 
provided 139 stipends to Georgian Muslims to take part in 
“Koran Courses” in Turkey. Şenol Korkut, “The Diyanet of 
Turkey and Its Activities in Eurasia after the Cold War,” in 
Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 28 (2009), pp. 125-126; pp. 
132-133. 
support to Adjaran Muslim institutions and 
organizations in the form of private donations.9697 
Turkey also exerts indirect influence on 
Adjara’s religious affairs by virtue of education-related 
migratory patterns. This pattern entails temporary 
relocation of young Adjarans to Turkish cities for 
purposes of both religious and secular higher 
education. Significant numbers of Muslim leaders in 
Adjara receive religious training at Muslim institutions 
in Turkey98, and so-called “Koran courses” – also 
administered in Turkey – remain popular among the 
younger, more religious segments of Adjara’s Muslim 
population.99 Because Turkish higher education is free, 
many Adjaran students also choose to study secular 
subjects in Turkey. Despite the non-religious nature of 
this type of education, Adjaran students often develop 
a stronger sense of Muslim identity in Turkey, which 
they subsequently bring back to Georgia.100 
Islamic regeneration has occurred in parallel 
with the expansion of the GOC in upper Adjara. The 
last two decades have seen the proliferation of 
numerous local Islamic institutions and organizations 
and, indeed, an increase in religiosity among certain 
segments of the population. However, the 
asymmetricality of this process has led to rifts within 
Adjara’s Muslim community – specifically, between 
the official muftiate and local Islamic institutions and 
organizations, and even among independent 
organizations themselves – and the primacy of foreign 
actors in terms of funding and religious education, 
especially Turkish religious organizations. 
Simultaneously, many Adjaran Muslims feel that the 
traditional lack of state support for Muslim institutions 
is a sign of state discrimination against Islam. As will 
be addressed in the next section, the Georgian 
government has recently made a number of unilateral 
policy decisions in the field of minority religious 
                                                            
96 While funding from Turkish organizations and private 
donors is a well-known fact, the process is not transparent 
and exact amounts of financial support are difficult to 
calculate. Interview with professor George Sanikidze, 
Tbilisi, November 11, 2011. 
97 Many new and renovated mosques in upper Adjara 
display plaques referencing private donors based in Turkey. 
A plaque beside the entrance of Didadjara’s renovated 
historic mosque, for example, reads “Opened for worship by 
the Samsun-Batra'lı Aydin and Ahmed Karahmeto-Gunar 
brothers in 2002” in both Georgian and Turkish. 
98 Interview with mufti Jemal Paksadze, Batumi, 13 
December 2011. 
99 Interview with professor Ruslan Baramidze, Batumi, 6 
December 2011. 
100 Interview with professor George Sanikidze, Tbilisi, 11 
November 2011. 
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issues, decisions which are supposedly intended to 
address issues in Adjara’s Muslim community and 
other minority religious groups. 
 
VI. PERCEPTIONS OF MUSLIM 
EXCLUSION AND THE PUSH FOR 
CIVIC INTEGRATION 
 
The dominant nationalist discourse, the primacy of 
orthodoxy in the public education history curriculum, 
and the state’s support for the GOC in post-Soviet 
Georgia pose certain problems for Adjara’s Muslim 
community. To be sure, inter-religious relations in the 
region are good, and Adjarans generally do not exhibit 
antipathy toward their neighbors who subscribe to 
different religious traditions. Yet, a sense of 
discrimination among the region’s Muslim leadership 
and the more religiously observant (i.e., non-middle 
class) segments of the Muslim population is 
undeniable. 
Many observant Muslims in Adjara express 
frustration with what they view as orthodoxy's 
monopoly on Georgian national identity, for Georgian 
Muslims generally express an equally ardent sense of 
patriotism as their Christian counterparts. All Georgian 
Muslims who were interviewed during the course of 
ECMI fieldwork in Adjara claimed loyalty to the 
Georgian nation and were adamant that their affiliation 
with Islam did not put them at odds with national 
interests. One prominent Muslim leader from Khulo 
stated in an interview, "We want our [Georgian] state 
to be strong, we like democratic laws. Our country 
strives for Euro-Atlantic integration, and we Muslims 
support it."101 
Information gathered during ECMI interviews suggests 
that some Muslims retain a mild sense of social 
exclusion as a result of Georgia’s nationalism 
paradigm. Mufti of Georgia Jemal Paksadze described 
this sentiment as such:  
 
“Earlier, the government never 
consulted with Muslims on the 
question of religion and national 
identity. Therefore, Muslims really 
never had opportunities to cultivate 
relationships with the government or 
establish faculties for religious 
training. We do not want the 
government to put our religion on a 
                                                            
101 Interview with mufti Aslan Abashidze, Khulo, 31 
October 2011. 
pedestal, we simply want equalization 
[with the Georgian Orthodox Church]. 
Georgian Muslims make sacrifices for 
the Georgian nation as well. For 
example, many Muslims serve in the 
army, but such things often go 
unrecognized.”102 
 
Thus a common perception among Muslims is 
that many Christian Georgians do not view them as 
legitimate stakeholders in the modern Georgian nation-
state. 
Muslim perceptions of social exclusion are 
evident in other contexts, especially with regard to the 
government's seeming lack of concern for the 
condition and operation of Muslim institutions. In 
sharp contrast to GOC institutions in Adjara, Muslim 
institutions – with the exception of the Batumi 
mosque, which is covered below – do not receive any 
state funding for renovation, construction, or 
education. Rather, Muslim institutions are largely 
reliant on donations and Turkish funding, though even 
these financial sources are not enough to shrink the 
resource gap with the GOC.103 
For many Muslims in upper Adjara, 
perceptions of state discrimination were crystallized by 
an incident in early 2010 related to the Muslim 
charitable foundation Madli-2005 in the Khulo district. 
According to a report released by the Tbilisi based 
Human Rights Center, a religious school operated by 
Madli-2005 in Khulo-Centre was closed by local 
authorities after a judgment was handed down by the 
Khelvachauri district court, which stated that Madli-
2005 had failed to pay taxes on the school and was 
guilty of "false substitution" of property.104 Shota 
                                                            
102 Interview with mufti Jemal Paksadze, Batumi, 13 
December 2011. 
103 The case of the Shuakhevi district muftiate is especially 
telling in this regard. The muftiate is located in the village of 
Khichauri, adjacent to the Tbel Abuseridze State University. 
Whereas the GOC-administered university occupies a 
heavily guarded, expansive former military base which was 
essentially granted by the state to the GOC, the Shuakhevi 
district muftiate is located in a small former television 
station. The muftiate’s current building was sold to the 
district Muslim administration in a 2010 state auction. 
Interview with Shuakhevi district mufti, Batumi, 10 
December 2011. 
104 According to the report, false substitution refers to the act 
of registering an individual as the official owner of a 
property, though in reality that property is owned by another 
individual or organization. In this case, the Khelvachauri 
district court claimed that Madli-2005 actually owned the 
houses in which its schools operated, though in fact all 
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Gabaidze, the foundation's head and a member of its 
board of directors, was arrested in 2009 for tax 
evasion. He was subsequently released on a plea 
bargain, though he was forced to pay a fine of GEL 
5,000 and sign the Madli-2005 building over to the 
state.105 Shortly thereafter in 2010, local authorities 
moved to close the school.106 
In Khulo-Centre, the attempted closure of the 
Madli-2005 school resulted in a number of protests 
among local Muslims. The independent television 
station TV 25 was present at the second major protest, 
with journalists conducting interviews with protestors 
and local government figures. In an interview with TV 
25 journalists, one older woman stated, "We Georgians 
are the same, regardless of whether we are Muslim or 
Christian. We don’t want this school to close; we want 
it preserved for our children and for our future. 
Everybody can pray where they want, there are 
churches as well as mosques. We don’t bother anyone 
so they shouldn’t bother us." The positive social role 
of the school in the community was also cited by 
protestors. According to another woman, "This is a 
great school. Here they dress, feed and teach poor 
children. They teach them civility so when they go out 
                                                                                                       
leased properties were registered as the property of Jumber 
Kakhadze, a private citizen and resident of the village 
Beghleti. 
More troubling is the fact that the National Agency of Public 
Registration confirmed Kakhadze's ownership of the Khulo 
property, which had already been leased to Madli-2005 for a 
period of ten years. The Adjara Execution Bureau requested 
the extraction of the property from the Public Registry. 
Though the request was initially refused, the Public Registry 
eventually issued the extraction on June 10, 2011 
whereupon the property was listed as belonging to the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara. The legal basis for the 
extraction was "Resolution #495 of the Government of 
Georgia 24.04.2010," though at the point of the extraction 
the Georgian government had only enacted 165 resolutions 
during 2010. Thus the extraction was apparently carried out 
at the behest of individuals in the government, rather than 
through resolution #495. 
105 This was in fact legally untenable, as the rest of the 
organization's board members would have had to sign the 
agreement to legally transfer the property to the state. Madli-
2005 and opponents of the state's actions maintain that the 
transfer of property to the state was untenable in the first 
place because the building technically belonged to a private 
citizen and not the charitable organization. As for the issue 
of taxes, figures connected with the organization told ECMI 
that Madli-2005 should not have been subject to taxes 
because it relies exclusively on charitable donations. 
106 “Muslim Protest,” in Religions in Georgia, the Human 
Rights Center (HRIDC), 16 February 2011 
http://religiebi.info/index.php?a=main&pid=17&lang=eng. 
in the streets they won’t become bandits." An older 
man stated that the school's students "study honesty 
and kindness. Yes, they study religion but these traits 
are incorporated in the religion."107 
Following Gabaidze's transfer of the building 
to the government, authorities had originally intended 
to establish a ‘youth centre’ in the school.108 In light of 
the strong reaction from local Muslims, however, the 
state partially backed down and transferred jurisdiction 
of the building to the Adjaran muftiate in Batumi. The 
building is now operational again, and Madli-2005 has 
continued its administration of religious education at 
the building. 
In many respects, the Madli-2005 incident was 
a watershed moment in state-Muslim relations in upper 
Adjara, for rarely have such sentiments been publicly 
expressed in such large numbers since the early 1990s. 
The episode was also important because it came at a 
time when the Georgian government could not afford 
such a potentially explosive public relations disaster. 
Specifically, the authorities’ actions were in sharp 
contrast to the official policy of civic integration, 
which Georgia’s post-rose revolution government has 
pursued in order to strengthen relations with the West 
and prepare Georgia for a possible EU candidacy 
bid.109 
Whereas the Saakashvili government paid 
comparatively little attention to minority religious 
rights during much of its tenure,110 a number of 
developments in 2011 suggest that the government 
may be treating the issue of civic integration and 
minority religious groups more seriously. The first 
such development was the creation of the 
Administration of Georgian Muslims (AGM) in 
                                                            
107 P’rot’est’I khuloshi, TV 25, 31 July 2010,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXA7ATqaYVw. 
108 Jumber Kakhadze, the owner of the building, claimed 
that Khulo district governor Levan Abashidze indicated the 
building would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the GOC, 
a claim which Abashidze denied. 
109 As one Georgian political analyst notes, “Georgia’s 
insistence on being a liberal democracy is largely identity-
driven, in the sense that the country wants to be a liberal 
democracy in order to prove that it is Western and that it can 
be a modern nation-state…” However, such modernizing 
projects often lead to a backlash by conservative elements – 
in this case the GOC – who view ‘liberal ideology’ as a 
threat to the traditional conception of the nation. Ghia 
Nodia, “Georgia: Dimensions of Insecurity,” in Statehood 
and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, Bruno 
Coppieters and Robert Legvold, eds., The MIT Press, 
Cambridge (2005), p. 73.  
110 See ibid. 
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May.111 Though officially not a state body, the AGM 
was established with assistance from the Georgian 
government. The body is led by sheikh Vagip 
Akapilov, an ethnic Azeri from the Kvemo Kartli 
region; mufti Jemal Paksadze, who now serves as 
mufti of both Adjara and all of Georgia; and imam 
Iasin Aliyev, who leads prayers at Tbilisi’s Juma 
Mosque. The AGM officially serves all of Georgia’s 
Muslim groups – ethnic Azeris in Kvemo Kartli and 
ethnic Kists in Pankisi included – with the goal of 
representing them on the state level and – according to 
one senior member of the body – to act as a “bridge 
between the Muslim community and the Georgian 
government.”112 
The second major development regarding civic 
integration and minority religions was the Saakashvili 
government’s passage of a law on the registration of 
minority religious groups in July. Under the new law, 
those religious groups with “close historic ties to 
Georgia” may register as so-called entities of public 
law. This legal status, which is currently held by most 
government bodies as well as the GOC, is an 
improvement over the status traditionally held by 
minority religious groups – noncommercial entity of 
private law. Whereas the former provides official 
recognition as a religious group, the latter is equivalent 
to the legal status of a non-governmental 
organization.113 Following the law’s passage, the AGM 
was registered as an entity of public law, along with 
the Caucasus Administration of Latin Catholics, the 
Chaldo-Assyrian Catholic community of Georgia, and 
the Spiritual Assembly of Yazidis of Georgia.114 Thus 
these minority religious groups officially have legal 
parity with the GOC, though in reality the 2002 
Concordat provides for a considerably more privileged 
standing for the church.115 
                                                            
111 Since the 1980s, Caucasian Muslims fell under the 
religious jurisdiction of the Baku-based Caucasus Board of 
Muslims (CBM). Led by Alahshukur Pashazade, the CBM 
was essentially a state controlled religious entity aimed at 
controlling Muslim affairs in the region. After the fall of the 
USSR, the board remained in place and retained spiritual 
jurisdiction, so to speak, over the region’s Muslims. 
Unsurprisingly, the CBM’s reaction to the creation of the 
AGM was not favorable. 
112 Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan and Georgia: Rival Groups 
Seek to Speak for Georgia’s Muslims,” EurasiaNet, 7 July 
2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63822. 
113 Ibid. 
114 “Four Groups Registered For Now Under New Law of 
Legal Status of Religious Minorities,” Civil Georgia, 28 
September 2011, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23974. 
115 Nevertheless, the GOC is highly critical of the 
registration law. In addition to feeling excluded from the 
There has been some criticism of how these 
measures were passed. Religion expert Levan 
Abashidze maintains that, though a seemingly positive 
step, the Georgian government entirely neglected to 
consult the relevant religious communities before the 
measures were put into effect.116 One EU official also 
claimed that these developments were more an 
indication of the government’s wish to please the West 
while simultaneously hindering the self-organization 
of independent religious groups out of the 
government’s supervision.117 Additionally, ECMI 
research conducted in the Kvemo Kartli region in 2011 
suggests that many of Georgia’s ethnic Azeris have 
reacted negatively to the AGM and registration law.118 
However, the reception of the AGM and the 
law on registration has generally been positive among 
Adjaran Muslims. First of all, the measures have 
already yielded a few tangible benefits. Before the 
passage of the registration law, Muslim religious 
figures held unofficial documentation of their 
respective religious titles (e.g., imam, mufti). 
However, Muslim leaders are now able to officially 
document their positions on special registration lists, 
thus conceivably increasing their legitimacy in the 
eyes of their religious constituents. The process of 
building a mosque, previously complicated and always  
contingent on the permission of local authorities, has 
been made easier, at least in theory.119 There have also 
been financial benefits in one case. Specifically, the 
mosque in Batumi – also the seat of the region’s 
                                                                                                       
decision-making process, many church officials see the law 
as an attack on the church and the Georgian nation. In their 
view, the government has made concessions to ‘foreign’ 
religious groups by allowing these groups to claim and 
register ‘territory’ (i.e., religious buildings) within Georgia; 
conversely, the GOC has not been granted reciprocal status 
in Turkey or Armenia, where a considerable number of 
historic Georgian orthodox sites are located. Speaking about 
the law, one orthodox priest in Khulo said, “There is a lot of 
Georgian territory [churches and monasteries] in Turkey and 
Armenia, and yet if I go there, I am not allowed the same 
rights because the Georgian Orthodox Church doesn’t have 
the same status there [as foreign religious groups have here]. 
That’s what the registration law is about. Why should we 
give them status in Georgia if they aren’t willing to 
reciprocate?” Interview in Khulo, 18 October 2011. 
116 Interview with religion expert Levan Abashidze, Tbilisi, 
29 November 2011. 
117 Interview in Tbilisi, 29 November 2011. 
118 See Conor Prasad, ECMI Working Paper #58 "Georgia`s 
Muslim Community: A Self- Fulfilling Prophecy?”.  
119 No new mosque construction has commenced since the 
measures’ implementation. Interview with professor Ruslan 
Baramidze, Batumi, 6 December 2011. 
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official muftiate – has begun to receive financial 
support from the state for renovation.120 
Every Muslim leader interviewed by ECMI 
either had a positive view of or were hopeful of the 
potential of the AGM and law on registration, for 
many Muslims have long wished for an organization 
with the authority to represent their religious interests 
on the national level. Nevertheless, Muslim leaders 
recognize that these measures may prove ineffectual in 
the long run. Aside from the mosque in Batumi, no 
other Islamic building in Adjara has been officially 
registered under the provisions of the new law, which 
is a prerequisite for receiving financial support from 
the state. Khulo mufti Aslan Abashidze stated that the 
Khulo muftiate administration has already made 
several requests to the state for financial support for 
mosque renovation, but to no avail. “It would be nice 
to have state funding for the upkeep of our mosques. 
However, we can never be sure if the government will 
actually respond to our requests. We have already 
made a number of requests, but they still haven’t 
answered”121 Mufti Jemal Paksadze likewise conceded 
that additional funding is largely contingent on what 
the government decides.122 
Thus the creation of the AGM and the new law 
on registration both appear as positive steps toward 
civic integration and closer relations with Europe. 
However, the measures’ effectiveness is largely 
dependent on the benefits they bring to Adjara’s 
Muslim community and Adjaran Muslims’ perception 
of their effectiveness. Though religious figures have 
been officially registered and renovation of the Batumi 
mosque is underway, funding requests for other 
Muslim buildings in Adjara have gone unanswered. 
All Muslim leaders hope for an uptick in state support, 





This working paper has sought to provide an accurate 
account of the current religious situation in the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara. The region’s Muslim 
identity has indeed been weakened in light of post-
Soviet political developments, which have entailed the 
essentially exclusive association between Georgian 
orthodoxy and Georgian national identity. As a result, 
                                                            
120 During the course of ECMI fieldwork in early December 
this renovation was already in progress. 
121 Interview with mufti Aslan Abashidze, Khulo, 8 
December 2011. 
122 Interview with mufti Jemal Paksadze, Batumi, 13 
December 2011. 
certain segments of Adjara’s Muslim population – for 
example, the young, the socially mobile, the relatively 
well educated middle class, and urbanites – have 
reconfigured their religious identity, sometimes opting 
for conversion to Christianity, other times simply 
diminishing their Muslim identity. Simultaneously, the 
Georgian Orthodox Church has made inroads in 
Adjara, most noticeably in the lowlands and to a lesser 
– yet growing – extent in the highland districts of 
Shuakhevi and Khulo. Church construction has 
continued, and many important education institutions 
in the region are administered by the GOC. Moreover, 
in secondary schools, the instruction of religion’s role 
in Georgian history is focused almost exclusively on 
Christianity, largely as a result of the GOC’s 
consultative prerogatives in the field of public 
education. 
Yet, there remains a sizeable segment of 
Adjara’s population that is keen to preserve its Muslim 
traditions. Such Muslims are adamant about their 
loyalty to the Georgian nation and, unlike many other 
Georgians, they do not see a contradiction between 
their Muslim beliefs and their Georgian identity. 
Above all, perhaps, Adjara’s Muslims wish for 
effective civic integration and the development of a 
civic nationalism that is not contingent on religious 
affiliation. It is also important to recognize that, 
despite the GOC’s expansion in the region and the 
growing preponderance among Adjarans to convert to 
Christianity, the reemergence of Muslim institutions 
has likewise taken place, though this growth has 
admittedly been asymmetrical given theological and 
geographical divergences within the region’s Muslim 
community, not to mention foreign influences. 
As noted, relations between religious groups in 
Adjara are generally positive, though problems 
associated with Muslim perceptions of social exclusion 
remain an issue. The Georgian government’s recent 
measures on the representation and status of religious 
minority groups signal a positive step in Georgia’s 
civic integration project. Likewise, the government – 
at least publicly – regularly promotes inter-religious 
dialogue, as it is quite common for Saakashvili and 
other government officials (in particular, the chairman 
of the Government of Adjara Levan Varshalomidze) to 
congratulate Muslims on major Islamic holidays. 
However, there are a number of steps the Georgian 
government could take to further ameliorate the 
religious situation in Adjara. 
In the field of public education, the Georgian 
government could partially reassess the instruction of 
history in Adjara’s secondary schools. In terms of 
religion in the Georgian context, the current history 
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curriculum focuses exclusively on orthodoxy. That 
orthodoxy occupies a significant role is not 
problematic in itself, for Christianity indeed has a long 
association with Georgia and should be taught as an 
element of the country’s history. The main problem is 
that Islam in the Adjaran context is not sufficiently 
covered. When teachers do breach the subject, Islam is 
often conveyed as a historical aberration imposed by 
Ottoman conquerors on primordially Christian 
Adjarans. This historical conception essentially ignores 
the fact that many Adjarans do not view Islam as a 
mere historical aberration, and they would accordingly 
like to retain their Muslim traditions. Thus a refined 
curriculum might include the objective instruction of 
both the Christian and Islamic elements of Adjara’s 
history. In this way, social inclusion could be 
facilitated from an early age, as the notion that one 
must categorically subscribe to orthodoxy in order to 
be considered a true Georgian could be challenged. 
Another issue the Georgian government 
should address relates to religious training for Muslim 
leaders. During the course of ECMI interviews in 
Adjara, a number of interviewees expressed concerns 
about the quality of religious education that Adjaran 
Muslims receive in Turkey and other foreign locations. 
One Adjaran government official claimed that many 
religious officials who study abroad gain a shallow 
understanding of Islam and are not able to discuss 
religious matters fluently.123 In other cases, the 
religious values that foreign trained Georgian Muslim 
leaders gather abroad and import to Georgia often 
diverge from local customs in the Georgian context, 
thus creating an uncomfortable situation in which 
foreign theological elements clash with accepted 
tradition.124 
Accordingly, the Georgian government could 
facilitate greater opportunities for domestic Islamic 
education. Namely, a religious faculty could be created 
in Tbilisi with the express purpose of training the 
country’s Islamic clergy. Of course, arrangements 
would have to be made for the training of Georgia’s 
Sunni and Shiite groups, but the basic premise remains 
the same. In this manner, the government could 
facilitate the implementation of religious training that 
satisfies the spiritual needs of Georgia’s Muslim 
communities while preventing clashes between 
religious doctrine and cultural tradition. It should also 
be mentioned that many of Adjara’s Muslim leaders 
expressed an interest in domestic religious education. 
                                                            
123 Interview at Adjaran parliament, Batumi, 5 December 
2011. 
124 Interview with professor Ruslan Baramidze, Batumi, 6 
December 2011. 
Likewise, several religion experts and government 
officials have made similar recommendations. 
Finally, the issue of funding deserves a closer 
look. In order to follow up on its recent civic 
integration initiatives, the Georgian government may 
consider the possibility of providing some funding for 
Muslim institutions in Adjara. Though the mosque in 
Batumi has been registered and is already receiving 
state support for renovation, other Muslim buildings in 
Adjara have yet to be registered. The government 
could possibly devise a funding method for religious 
institutions in the more rural areas in Adjara, such as 
providing a lump sum to district muftiates whereupon 
local Muslim leaders could decide which religious 
buildings receive material support. 
Funding is, understandably, a thorny issue. 
Adjara’s Muslim leaders are aware that extensive state 
funding for mosques and madrassahs may very well be 
a chimera. Concurrently, many elements in the 
government seem unlikely to support the idea of such 
financial support, at least on a large scale. One official 
at the Georgian Public Defender’s Office, though 
generally critical of the GOC, expressed opposition to 
the entire concept of granting public status to more 
religious groups because “the state will be obligated to 
pay for all of them.”125 Constitutionality is also an 
issue when discussing state support for Muslim 
institutions, given that Article IX calls for the 
separation between religion and state. Of course, the 
state has technically been contravening the constitution 
for the last two decades by providing direct financial 
support to the GOC. Many Muslim leaders in Adjara 
recognize this reality and are thus inclined to call for a 
relationship with the state similar to what the GOC 
enjoys. 
The religious situation in Adjara is complex 
and, given recent developments, it is likely to remain 
so in the years to come. This working paper has sought 
to provide a picture of the current religious situation in 
the region, focusing especially on the tendency of 
many Adjarans to convert to Christianity, the effects of 
education institutions on religious life in upper Adjara, 
and recent state religious policies and issues within the 
Muslim community. 
                                                            
125 Interview with the head of the Public Defender’s 
Tolerance Centre Beka Mindiashvili, Tbilisi, 28 November 
2011. Accordingly, Mindiashvili believes the distinction 
between “public” versus “private” entity should not be made 
at all, which includes the GOC. However, given the vast 
prerogatives the GOC currently enjoys, it would be next to 
impossible to downgrade the church’s legal status. Such a 
policy would likely create considerable conflict and be 
tantamount to political suicide for the current government. 
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However, further work is needed to gain a 
deeper understanding of a number of issues, including 
the role and divergent theological opinions of 
independent Islamic organizations in the region; the 
role of Turkish religious training; and a village-by-
village quantitative study of Adjarans’ perceptions of 
the religious situation in their region and their trust in 
religious institutions. Furthermore, the government 
would do well to implement its civic integration 
measures (i.e., AGM and the law on registration) in 
Adjara by consulting with members of the region’s 
Muslim community rather than acting unilaterally, as 
well as by ensuring that this program actually has 
tangible benefits for the community in question. Above 
all, the government should strive to see that ethnic 
Georgian Muslims be treated fairly and respectfully, 
and that they be regarded as legitimate members of the 
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